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INDIANS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS-OLD RIVALS, NEW
RULES: A BRIEF REVIEW AND COMPARISON OF INDIAN
LAW IN THE CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES, ALASKA,
AND CANADA
James E. Torgerson*
Introduction
For decades the native peoples of North America resisted the
engulfing surge of European settlers. The struggle continues to-
day, though the battle has moved from deserts and woodlands
to courts and legislatures. Today it is a battle of legal fights, fought
with words, not weapons. For the past century, natives have waged
this battle with varying degrees of success. Perhaps the struggle
has never been more fruitful than over the past dozen years. In
that time, Canadian natives succeeded in getting their aboriginal
and treaty rights entrenched in the new Canadian constitution;
some Indians in the forty-eight contiguous states won major court
victories in fishing rights cases in the Northwest and in land claim
cases in the Northeast; and Alaskan natives received a settlement
of their claim to the lands of that state exceeding 40 million acres
of land and $950 million.
In light of these changes, the purpose of this article is to briefly
review, compare, and analyze the rights and resources held today
by the native populations of the forty-eight contiguous United
States, Alaska, and Canada. In the first four parts of the article,
the contiguous forty-eight states, Alaska, and Canada are con-
sidered separately. The analysis section contains a number of obser-
vations and recommendations applicable to all three regions.
I. History
Both the United States' and Canada's policies toward their native
peoples have fluctuated greatly since the countries were first
formed. In 1976, Congressman Lloyd Meeds, vice-chairman of
the American Indian Policy Review Commission, made the follow-
ing observations about the United States' Indian policy:
The federal policy implementing [the Indian-governmental] rela-
tionship has shifted and changed with different Administrations
and passing years. These policies have included peacemaking
diplomacy, armed conflict, tribal removal, subjugation, exter-
* B.A., 1980, Bethel College, Minnesota; J.D., 1984, University of Washington.
D.A., District Attorney's Office, Anchorage, Alaska.
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rninations, concentration, assimilation, termination, and self-
determination-not necessarily in that order.... In short, there
exists a unique relationship between the United States and In-
dian tribes which has never been admitted [sic] of an expert
definition and which has never been implemented by a coherent
consistent policy.'
Although the Canadian government's fluctuations have not been
as extreme, it has failed to implement an ordered policy in deal-
ing with its native peoples. A brief review of the shifting policies
of these two countries will provide a context for examining the
special relationships, property interests, and jurisdictional limits
possessed by the natives of the forty-eight contiguous United States,
Alaska, and Canada.
United States
During the early European occupation of North America, In-
dian tribes were considered to be sovereign powers.' Accordingly,
only other sovereign powers could make treaties with them. In
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, where Great Britain set aside
an enormous reserve for Indians in the territory of the present-
day United States, 3 British subjects were forbidden the privilege
of "making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, to taking
Possession of any of the Lands above reserved" without explicit
penmission.4 Upon its inception, the fledgling United States govern-
ment claimed similar exclusive jurisdiction in dealing with Indians.
Beginning in 1790, Congress passed a number of Indian noninter-
course acts. Under the acts, treaties or agreements entered into
between states or private citizens and the Indian tribes required
congressional ratification to be valid.' The nonintercourse acts
were the first of many congressional actions establishing the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the federal government to deal with and
legislate over Indian tribes.'
In 1830, having concluded that it was impossible for whites
and Indians to live together in the East, Congress passed the In-
1. T. BERGER, BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION TO THE OVERVIEW HEARINGS, ALASKA
NATIVE REVIEW COMEISSION 6 (1984).
2. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832).
3. R. SurRTEEs, CANADIAN INDIAN POLICY 22 (1982).
4. MnIST OF INDIAN AFFAIRS & NoRTsERN DEVELOpmENT, IN ALL FAIRNESS 9 (1981).
5. Johnson, The U.S. Indian Fishing Rights Controversy, in COASTAL RESOURCES
IN THE FUTURE OF BRrTISH COLUMBIA 107 (A. Dorcey ed. 1980).
6. Id.
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dian Removal Act.7 Subsequently, from 1832 to 1842, the federal
government relocated "portions of [the] 'Five Civilized Tribes'
from the southeastern states to Indian Territory." 8 "Indian Ter-
ritory," as defined in the Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, was
all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and
not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory
of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of
the Mississippi River, and not within any state to which Indian
title has not been extinguished. 9
By the 1850s Indian Territory had been opened to settlement.
Again, numerous conflicts arose.' The federal policy changed from
one of demanding relocation to one of creating reservations. 1 Plac-
ing the Indians on reservations served the dual purposes of: (1)
separating Indians and non-Indians, and (2) ensuring Indians at
least a remnant of their lands on which to govern themselves and
continue their own culture and traditions. 2 This process was essen-
tially completed by the 1880s. At that time only the Apaches under
Geronimo were still fighting and soon they too were overcome.13
"Rations of food and clothing were made available [to the reser-
vation Indians] in lieu of being able to hunt in customary places.""
It was about this time that Congress stopped making treaties
with Indian tribes.' 5 In the Indian Appropriation Act of 1872,
Congress reaffirmed treaties made before 1871, but mandated that
in the future "agreements," rather than treaties, would be
negotiated with tribes. This change affected Indian sovereignty
because reservations were subsequently established by executive
order agreements which were easily amended.' 6 In 1871, at the
end of the treaty era, 389 treaties had been entered into between
the United States and Indian tribes.' 7 Post-1871 agreements con-
7. R. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 29 (1978).
8. Id.
9. Non-Intercourse Act of 1834, 4 Stat. 729.
10. Johnson, supra note 5, at 107.
11. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 29.
12. Johnson, supra note 5, at 107.
13. G. GROSSMAN, THE SovEREiGNrY OF AMEmCAN INDIAN TRIBES: A MATTER OF
LE;AL HISTORY 6 (1979).
14. R. ARNoLD, supra note 7, at 29.
15. Id.
16. G. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 7.
17. Keon-Cohen, Native Justice in Australia, Canada and the U.S.A.: A Comparative
Analysis, 7 MONASH U. L. REv. 287 (1981).
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tinued to guarantee Indians reserved lands and other compensa-
tion in exchange for claims to their historical territories. Indian
land holdings in 1887 totaled 136,985 acres.18
In 1887, the United States' Indian policy changed dramatically.
Inspired by reform-minded religious groups who desired to remedy
the poverty and powerlessness of reservation Indians and supported
by other parties less concerned with Indian interests than with
opening Indian lands to settlers, the General Allotment Act of
1887 gave the Secretary of the Interior power to issue a patent
in fee simple to qualified Indian allottees.I9 The intent of the legisla-
tion was to encourage the civilization of the Indians by giving
them individual ownership of parcels of land on the reservations.
The Indian allottees were then expected to take up farming and
the ways of the white man. 2 Actually, the land allotted to In-
dians was then purchased from them by non-Indians, who thereby
gained control of much of the best agricultural and mineral land
on the reservations. By the time this era of allotments and assimila-
tion ended in 1934,21 Indians had only 48 million acres of land
left.22 Not only had they lost almost 100 million acres of land,
but in many places they had lost their traditional system of com-
mon ownership of land. As a result, Indians identified less with
their tribe and tribal governments became less important.23
Reform sentiment arose again in the 1920s. Indians were given
United States citizenship by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.24
More significant, the Meriam Commission Report of 1928
adamantly denounced the allotment policy and proposed sweep-
ing reforms.2 5 By 1934, Congress implemented many of the Meriam
Commission recommendations when it enacted the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act. The Act, also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act,
was intended to stabilize "the tribal organization of Indian tribes by
vesting such tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority,
18. TnE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN INDIAN
JURSDICTION 5 (1976) [hereinafter INDIAN JURISDICTION].
19. See Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 through
381 (1982)).
20. INDIAN JURISDICTION, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21. D. GETCrmS, D. ROSENFELD & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 79 (1979).
22. INDIAN JURISDICTION, supra note 18, at 5.
23. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 56.
24. Ch. 233, 43 Stat, 253 (1924). See also G. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 10.
25. L. MERLAm, THm PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928).
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and prescribing conditions which must be met by such tribal organiza-
tions." ' 26 Furthermore, the Act ended the allotment system and estab-
lished more reservation land.27 Also passed in 1934, the Johnson-
O'Malley Act helped Indians gain more state welfare services and
helped more Indian children gain access to public education.2"
The United States' Indian policy changed again in the late 1940s.
Foreshadowing what was later labeled the "termination era," In-
dians were encouraged by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to
migrate from reservations to urban centers. Although relocation
centers were established in some key urban areas, these centers
provided aid to arrivals for only a brief period.29 Thus, by 1953
the House of Representatives asked the BIA to terminate the special
services and the tribal status of tribes that were "economically
self-sufficient enough to do without federal services." ' 3 Subse-
quently, approximately a hundred reservations were disestab-
lished. 3' Public Law 280, enacted in 1953, had an even more
widespread impact. It was designed to withdraw federal protec-
tions and permit states to extend their laws to Indian lands, with
or without the consent of the tribes.32
The termination era ended in 1961 and Indian self-determination
was proposed. Laws were enacted and executive actions taken that
reversed the termination trend. The Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 imposed potentially serious limitations on the freedom of
tribes to govern their own members. Even in that legislation,
however, Congress exhibited some sensitivity to tribal sovereignty
by omitting from the Act some rights guaranteed in the Constitu-
tion (such as the prohibition of the governmental establishment
of religion) that clearly would have conflicted with traditional In-
dian practices.33
Recently, there has been some backlash against the Indian asser-
tions of sovereignty and property rights. This has been fueled in
large part by successful Indian land litigation in the Northeast
and successful assertions of fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest.3"
26. S. REP. No. 1080, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
27. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq. (1982)).
28. Ch. 147, 48 Stat. 596 (25 U.S.C. §§ 452 et seq. (1982)).
29. G. GROSSMAAN, supra note 13, at 13.
30. Id.
31. Johnson, supra note 5, at 108.
32. G. GRossMAN, supra note 13, at 14.
33. Id.
34. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 260.
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Although this backlash seems to have subsided, it produced several
blatantly anti-Indian bills, none of which became law.35 On the
other hand, Congress has enacted some legislation favorable to
Indians, notably the Indian Health Care Improvement Act in
1976,36 the Native American Religious Freedom Act," and In-
dian Child Welfare Act in 1978.38
The current national policy supports Indian self-determination.
Recent legislation and a number of recent court cases have solidified
the sovereignty of tribes. Even so, especially on the frontier where
tribal jurisdiction touches upon the lives or property of non-
Indians, the legal border war continues.
Alaska
The history of Alaska and the history of the contiguous forty-
eight states obviously have much in common. As a territory, Alaska
was subject to the same laws as the other states respecting its In-
dian population. Even so, historical differences exist that differen-
tiate the present situation of the natives of Alaska from the In-
dians of the contiguous forty-eight states.
Vitus Bering is credited with "discovering" Alaska in 1741. 39
Alaska at that time was inhabited by an estimated 74,000 natives
including Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians. ° Shortly thereafter came
fleets of Russian fur traders. They never sought to colonize Alaska;
gathering furs, especially sea otters, was their sole objective. 41 Con-
sequently, the number of Russians in the colony was never very
large, peaking in 1823 and averaging 550 people from 1799 to
1867.42
By the 1860s, Russia had good reasons to sell Alaska to the
United States. Its experience in the Crimean War put in question
its ability to defend Alaska against other nations. Moreover, the
Russian American Company was losing money. 43 Negotiations be-
tween the two countries were completed speedily, and the treaty
35. Id. at 261.
36. Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (25 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982)).
37. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978)).
38. Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901
et seq. (1982)).
39. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 8.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id. at 24.
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was signed in 1867. It failed to define clearly the status of the
natives." As of 1867, pursuant to the treaty, the "uncivilized
tribes" were officially "subject to such laws and regulations as
the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to
aboriginal tribes in that country.''5
Subsequently, Alaska natives were subject to the United States'
federal jurisdiction like other Indian residents of the United States.
Two important distinctions, however, differentiated the natives
of Alaska from the Indians in the contiguous forty-eight states.
First, they had, with minor exceptions, no agreements with the
federal government that "quieted" their aboriginal title to their
traditional lands in Alaska. 6 Second, with minor exceptions,
Alaska natives did not live on or have any reservations. "7 Because
of these factors, among others, the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act (ANCSA) was enacted. Because ANCSA will be discussed
below in more detail, it is sufficient to note here that ANCSA
establishes a different system of federal, state, and native inter-
relationships from that in existence in the contiguous forty-eight
states.
Canada
The first Europeans in eastern Canada were the French, who,
unlike the British, did not acknowledge the Indians' title to land.
As a result, they made no treaties with Indians.48 French coloniza-
tion had two primary effects on Indians: (1) to begin the assimila-
tion process through Christianizing the Indian and (2) to arouse
anti-British sentiments among the Indians, especially those in what
later became the maritime provinces.4 9
The British vanquished the French in Canada and with the 1753
Treaty of Paris, Britain became the only European power to have
official contact with Canada's natives. In the Royal Proclama-
tion of 1763, Great Britain set forth its first Indian policy. It sought
to avoid, or at least minimize, contact with Indians in order to
reduce conflict and created a huge Indian reserve, encompassing
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id.
46. FaLix S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 743 (R. Strickland et al.,
eds. 1982) [hereinafter F. COHEN].
47. Id. at 743-46.
48. S. WEAVER, MAKING CANADIAN INDuN POLICY 32 (1983).
49. R. SuRTEEs, supra note 3, at 19.
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an area from southern Ontario to the Gulf of Mexico, and from
the Appalachian highlands to the Mississippi River. 0 The Indian
inhabitants were assured sole occupancy and proprietary rights
to the area. 1
Beginning in 1783, British Indian policy changed from protect-
ing Indians from white encroachments to purchasing their lands
for settlement and for military purposes.2 This change corres-
ponded with a change in the way the British perceived the In-
dians. Their importance as warriors, either as allies or as adver-
saries, decreased as the white population in Canada increased.
The tribes became less of a military presence and more of a hin-
drance to white expansion.
In 1830 the policy of assimilation was officially adopted. The
first step in implementing this policy was to collect the Indians
on reserved lands." The use of reserves was to be a temporary
system of separate development designed to educate and Chris-
tianize the Indians and to establish agriculture as the primary
economic base. Some argued that this process could be accelerated
by giving the Indians fee simple title to their property, with the
pride of private ownership encouraging more rapid assimilation.
By the 1840s, however, this argument had been defeated by op-
ponents who maintained that such actions would result in the In-
dians losing their lands and losing their reserves.5 4
In 1860, seven years before the formation of the Confedera-
tiorn in 1867, Britain transferred control of Indian affairs to the
province of Canada. Canada inherited, without significant revi-
sion, the general framework of British Indian policy. The prin-
ciples of protection and assimilation remained. The techniques
of education, Christianization, and reservations were also retained.
To the degree that Indian policy continued to evolve, it became
increasingly legalistic in determining who qualified as an Indian
and increasingly antagonistic toward the symbols and traditions
of the Indians' heritage.15
The Canadian government continued Britain's practice of signing
treaties with Indian tribes. Between 1871 and 1877, seven major
land cessions secured for the government the central and southern
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at 25.
53. Id. at 34.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Id. at 44.
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portions of the Canadian West. 6 These treaties were entered into
pursuant to Canada's recognition of the existence of Indian title.
As the Governor General, the Earl of Dufferin, said in a speech
in Victoria, British Columbia in 1876:
In Canada... no Government, whether provincial or central,
has failed to acknowledge that the original title to the land ex-
isted in the Indian tribes and communities that hunted or
wandered over them. Before we touch an acre we make a treaty
with the chiefs representing the bands we are dealing with,...
not until then do we consider that we are entitled to deal with
an acre.
5 7
The final treaty between Canada and its natives involved 372,000
square miles of land (an area eight times the size of the state of
New York) located mostly in the Northwest Territories. It was
signed in 1921. 5'
Even after this treaty, much of Canada had still not been
bargained away. "Non-treaty areas cover a wide arc of land, begin-
ning in Newfoundland and Labrador on the east, through
Quebec," 9 the eastern portion of the Northwest Territories, most
of Yukon Territory, and most of British Columbia in the west.
"The Maritimes had treaties, but Indians and legal scholars main-
tain that these treaties were pacts of peace and friendship, rather
than land surrenders. ' 60
Although some changes have occurred, litigating aboriginal land
claims was not worthwhile for Canadian natives in the past. This
is evidenced most clearly by a 1927 amendment to the Indian Act
that made it a "federal claim to take Indian claims to court, to
raise money to pursue Indian claims, or in fact to organize to
pursue Indian claims." 61 The 1927 amendment was repealed in
the 1930s. As late as 1969, however, the federal government's posi-
tion was still that "aboriginal claims are so general and unde-
fined that it is not realistic to think of them as specific claims
56. Id. at 48.
57. Sanders, Statement of Evidence, West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry, Presented by Union
of British Columbia Indian Chiefs 6 (Oct. 1977).
58. S. WEAWR, supra note 48, at 33.
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id.
61. Many Fingers, Commentaries: Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution, 19 ALBERTA
L. REv. 428, 429 (1981); Jackson, Statement of Evidence, West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry,
Presented by Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs 3 (October 1977).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1988
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
capable of remedy."' 62 Since then the Canadian government's
perspective has altered. In 1973 it recognized aboriginal title when
it indicated its commitment to negotiating outstanding claims, in-
cluding those based on aboriginal title.63
Canadian Indian policy has changed considerably in the last
fifteen years. Many of the changes have come as a reaction to
the 1969 Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian
Policy.6" This policy statement, which came to be known as the
"White Paper," was a proposal by the newly elected Trudeau
administration for assimilating Canada's Indians into the domi-
nant culture. It called for the repeal of legislation conferring special
rights upon Indians, the abolition of the Indian Department, the
transfer of responsibility for Indian affairs to the provincial govern-
ments, and the transfer of control over Indian lands to the In-
diani people themselves. 65 The proposal ignited an angry reaction
from the native community and sparked renewed interest in In-
dian affairs among the general public. In the face of almost
unanimous opposition, the proposals of the White Paper have
never been implemented. 66
The increased interest in and sensitivity to native affairs that
exists at present has produced a number of changes in the natives'
place in Canadian society. In addition to experiencing greater recep-
tivity to their aboriginal title claims, natives have been given special
recognition in Canada's new constitution. 6 Furthermore, as
demonstrated by studies of how resource development would af-
fect native communities, there appears to be a growing concern
with safeguarding indigenous cultures. Whether this is yet an ac-
cepted part of national policy remains unknown, as does the ques-
tion of what rights Canada's natives finally will secure for
themselves.68
II. Special Relationships
The survival of Native American cultures is directly linked to
the special legal recognition and protection afforded those cultures
62. STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON INDIAN POLICY, 1969.
63. Id.
64. Paper prepared by DIAND officials, mid-May, 1969.
65. R. SuRTEEs, supra note 3, at 55.
66. Id.
67. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution, 19 ALBERTA L. REV. 410 (1981).
68. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 262.
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in the past. In the future, this special relationship may become
even more important if Native Americans are to retain the resources
they currently control and keep the sovereignty they currently ex-
ercise. Thus, understanding the special relationship each region
has with its native people not only helps explain their histories
but also illuminates their futures. In this section, the following
questions about each region's special relationship to its native
people will be addressed. First, why does a special relationship
exist? Second, what is its legal basis? Third, where is it defined?
And last, what difference does it make in the treatment of Native
Americans?
United States
The unique legal relationship between the United States govern-
ment and Indians is known as a "trust relationship." This trust
relationship burdens the United States with a "fiduciary duty"
or "trust responsibility." The United States' trust responsibility
to Indians has been described as "the unique legal and moral duty
of the United States to assist Indians in the protection of their
property and rights. '6 9
Indians' property and rights were promised to them in several
hundred treaties, agreements, and executive orders. A trust respon-
sibility to protect what was promised developed for two reasons.
First, some of the treaties signed with the tribes specifically bespoke
the federal government's commitment to protect the Indians and
their property." More generally, the trust responsibility has
developed as a reflection of the country's conscience, to ensure
that past promises made to once-powerful opponents will be
honored despite the promisees' present powerlessness to enforce
performance. Although the United States could violate Indian
treaties with impunity, the trust relationship that developed is based
upon a recognition of the United States' continuing commitment
to keep its word.
Tribes, rather than individual Indians, are the true beneficiaries
of the trust relationship.7' This is because the treaties were signed
with tribes as sovereign nations. The federal government, specif-
ically the Congress, is the trustee. The constitutional power of
69. G. HALL, THE FEDERAL INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 3 (1979).
70. Id. at 4.
71. Individual Indians must maintain their tribal membership to qualify as beneficiaries.
See United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
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Congress to ratify Indian treaties and regulate commerce with In-
dian tribes provides the legal basis for its exclusive authority. Con-
gress has given the Department of the Interior the task of execut-
ing most of the duties of the trust responsibility. The Department
of the Interior is not, however, the only federal agency with com-
mitments to Indians. 71
Perhaps the most frequently cited statements of the federal trust
responsibility appear in early United States Supreme Court cases
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall." In Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, decided in 1831, Justice Marshall wrote that the tribes
were "domestic dependent nations ... in a state of pupilage"
to :he federal government and that "[t]heir relationship to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." ' 74 The
following year, in 1832, the Court iterated the exclusive and pro-
tective nature of the federal government's relationship to Indians
in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.71 Subsequently, other federal
courts have relied and expanded upon Justice Marshall's analysis
of the trust responsibility to protect Indian water rights from
reallocation, 76 Indian hunting and fishing rights from state regula-
tior, 77 Indian lands from taxation, 7 and Indian trust funds from
mismanagement. 79 Recently, this trust has been interpreted to re-
quire the federal government to provide Indians with adequate
medical services. 80
The Indian trust responsibility also obliges the federal govern-
merit to protect Indians' jurisdictional rights. The government must
do this, first, by providing legal representation when treaty rights
are threatened.8 Second, although Congress has unfettered power
to unilaterally limit or revoke Indian treaties, the courts have ap-
plied the trust responsibility doctrine to require Congress to signal
72. G. HAIL, supra note 69, at 8-9.
73. See P. FETZER, POLITICS, LAW AND INDIAN TREATIS 27-30 (1984).
74. 30 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
75. 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 561 (1832).
The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of congress.
76. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
77. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
78. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
79. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238
(C.D. Cal. 1973).
80. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
81. E.g., Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (lst Cir. 1975).
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clearly its intent to abrogate a treaty before a court will find such
an abrogation. 2 The courts also have developed protective rules
regarding the interpretation of treaties. Thus, courts will inter-
pret vague expressions in Indian treaties, agreements, and federal
statutes in favor of Indians,83 interpret treaties and agreements
as the signing Indians would have understood them,84 and inter-
pret Indian treaties and federal statutes liberally in favor of In-
dians.s
The special relationship between the United States and Indians
obligates the federal government not only to protect Indians' prop-
erty interests and right to self-government but also to provide
special services to Indians. As the Congress acknowledged in the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977, the nation has "special respon-
sibilities and legal obligations to the American Indian people." '86
These same thoughts were expressed in other recent legislation,
such as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 19757 and the 1976 Indian Health Care Improvement Act.8
Finally, the federal trust responsibility has been cited as a source
of congressional power to legislate over Indians on reservations.
This doctrine, stated in 1886 in United States v. Kagama,8 9 led
to a broad exercise of federal power over Indian affairs. Recently,
however, courts have viewed the trust relationship less as a source
of congressional power and more as a check on federal executive
powers.90
In summary, the United States' special relationship to Indians
is that of a trustee. The resulting responsibility requires that the
government protect the treaty and reserved rights assured Indians
in exchange for their land and provide them with the special ser-
vices it has explicitly or implicitly promised. Although the United
States has continued to erode Indian property interests and has
continued to limit their self-governing authority, the federal trust
responsibility has nonetheless been critical to the retention of In-
dians' special legal status in the United States.
82. P. FHTZER, supra note 73, at 69.
83. For example, Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th
Cir. 1975).
84. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
85. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
86. S. 1214 passed the Senate on Nov. 4, 1972.
87. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982)).
88. Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (25 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982)).
89. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
90. G. HALL, supra note 69, at 35.
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Alaska
The special relationship between Alaskan natives and the United
States federal government is like the special relationship between
Indians in the contiguous forty-eight states and the federal govern-
ment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently affirmed that:
Alaska Natives, including Eskimos and Aleuts have been con-
sidered to have the same status as other federally recognized
American Indians.... It is now established that through [the
1867 Treaty of Cession from Russia] the Alaskan Natives are
under the guardianship of the federal government and entitled
to the benefits of the special relationship."
Because the United States never made any treaties with Alaska
natives, the federal government's special relationship depends solely
upon statutory enactments, judicial decisions, and administrative
regulations for its definition. 92
Historically, this special relationship has burdened the United
States with four primary areas of responsibility. The first is the
preservation of native lands, pursued in Alaska through a federal
reservation program and the Allotment and Townsite acts. 93 The
second is the protection of native subsistence, which produced
the Reindeer Industry and Walrus Protection acts. 94 Third is the
promotion of native government, accomplished through t':e In-
dian Reorganization Act, which was amended in 1936 to apply
to Alaska;95 and last is the provision for comprehensive educa-
tion, health, welfare, economic development, and other human
services to Alaska natives, which has produced a plethora of legisla-
tion dating back to the turn of the century.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) became
effective in December of 1971. Although the reason for its enact-
ment was to settle land claims, it in fact recast the face of all
native law in Alaska. 96 The Act's declaration of policy states, in
part:
91. Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrs. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1168-69 (9th
Cir. 1982).
92. See D. CAsE, TiE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OF ALASKA NATVES TO THE FEDERAL
GovsmMEar 9 (1978).
93. See id. at 6.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6, 10-11.
[Vol. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol14/iss1/3
INDIANS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS
[Settlement of native claims] should be accomplished ... without
establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation system
or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without adding to the
categories of property and institutions enjoying special tax
privileges or to the legislation establishing special relationships.9"
How ANCSA has affected and will affect Alaskan natives'
special relationship with the federal government is uncertain. Seem-
ingly, the federal government's responsibility to provide special
services is unchanged. ANCSA states that its provisions "consti-
tute compensation for the extinguishment of claims to land, and
shall not be deemed to substitute for any governmental programs
otherwise available to the Native people of Alaska as citizens of
the United States and the State of Alaska." 98 Presumably, Con-
gress intended to restrict the natives' eligibility only for programs
and services that relate to trust lands.99 This assumption is sup-
ported by congressional action since the enactment of ANCSA.
Congress has included Alaska natives among those eligible under
all major post-ANCSA Indian legislation. '
The vitality of the federal government's duty to protect natives'
land and self-government is more problematic. Relying upon past
legislation and provisions of ANCSA, it appears that natives' prop-
erty interests will be, for the most part, shielded from state and
federal taxation. The Alaska Statehood Act expressly provides for
the exemption of all native-owned lands, other than lands held
in fee by individuals, from taxation. ' Although its language is
ambiguous, ANCSA appears to exempt ANCSA-patented lands
from state and local taxes. The only exception is that ANCSA-
patented lands that have been developed or leased to third parties
97. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1601(b) (1971).
98. Id. § 1626(a).
99. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 769.
100. See R. PmTLE & D. CASE, SUMMARY OF 1991 RELATED IRA Issus iN ALAsKA
11 (1983).
101. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). Enacted on July
7, 1958, the statute provided that "no taxes shall be imposed by said State upon any
lands or other property ... which ... may belong to said Natives, except to such extent
as the Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe, and except when held by indi-
vidual Natives in fee without restrictions or alienation."
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may be taxed by local governments.' ANCSA's tax-exemption
period, however, lasts only twenty years. 03
Future vulnerability to taxation is not the only characteristic
distinguishing ANCSA lands from other Indian lands. Under
ANCSA, for example, land is owned by a corporation rather than
a tribe. In light of these and other distinctions, it appears that
ANCSA has "fundamentally reduced" federal trust responsibilities
over Alaskan native lands.'"
Furthermore, Alaskan natives were deeply involved in the
development and passage of ANCSA. Their role was very differ-
ent from that of the frequently illiterate Indians with whom treaties
were made 150 years ago. As one writer noted, the natives were
"party to this settlement in a manner that makes their relation-
ship with the Federal Government distinct and distinguishable from
their traditional wardship status in the contiguous forty-eight."'"5
He concluded, therefore, that ANCSA, unlike other Indian legisla-
tion, did not have to be "construed in favor of the Natives at
all points."' '
Even after the adoption of ANCSA, Alaska natives have a right
to the same social services provided American Indians elsewhere,
but ANSCA has diminished the federal responsibility to protect
natives' lands. Thus, though ANCSA shifted immense wealth and
considerable managerial independence to the natives, it may have
done so at the cost of endangering the special trust relationship
Alaska natives have had with the federal government. 107
Canada
The special relationship between the United States government
and the indigenous people of the United States has been vital to
102. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 768.
103. Id. "Originally, the period was to expire on December 18, 1991, but the exemp-
tion period was extended to 'twenty years from vesting of title pursuant to the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act or the date of issuance of an interim conveyance
or patent, whichever is earlier."' Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendment, Pub.
L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 43 U.S.C. § 1620 (1980).
104. Price, Region-Village Relations Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
5 UCLA-ALsKA L. REv. 58, 61 (1975), cited in D. CASE, supra note 92, at 9. See also
R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 279-80.
105. Authority to Determine Eligibility of Native Villages After June 18, 1974, 81
I.D. 316, 325 (1974), cited in D. CASE, supra note 92, at 77. Case suggests that the In-
terior Department subsequently has rejected this position.
106. Id.
107. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 279.
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preserving natives' proprietary interests and self-governing author-
ity. No similar relationship exists between the Canadian govern-
ment and Canadian natives.1"8 Canadian natives have, however,
been accorded some special treatment by Canada's federal
government.
Historically, this special treatment was based on a marriage of
conscience and political common sense. In the Royal Proclama-
tion of 1763, the British Crown stated:
[I]t is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the
Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of
Indians... should not be molested or disturbed in the Posses-
sion of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not
having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them. 1 9
Thus, the British government and, after 1867, the Canadian govern-
ment acknowledged that Canada's natives merited special treat-
ment. Although in the past that special treatment arose from the
terms of treaties and the Indian Act, the Canadian government
has recently accepted the validity of aboriginal title and committed
itself to settling natives' claims to lands for which treaties have
never been signed." 0 Additionally, Canada has acknowledged the
natives' singular status by giving them special recognition in its
new constitution.
Even before the Royal Proclamation of 1763 formalized the
treaty-making process by confirming a Crown monopoly on the
purchase of Indian lands, treaties of peace and friendship were
signed with the Indians of the maritime provinces."' After con-
federation, the federal government continued the treaty-making
policy in the west. Although recognizing that Indians had some
right to their lands, the treaties were "fairly minimal documents."" 2
108. See Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 254. As is discussed further in the section
on the scope of Canadian natives' jurisdictional powers, neither Britain nor Canada ever
affirmed the natives' right to self-government. Correspondingly, they never recognized
natives as a separate, sovereign people. Consequently, no special relationship evolved to
ensure the federal government's performance. Instead, the natives received, at best, no
more than the specific property interests that they had been promised by treaties or granted
by the Indian Act. What self-governing powers they did have were conferred upon them
by the federal government. The federal government did not accept the notion that the
Indians had reserved rights to self-government.
109. Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, 8 QUEENS
L.J. 232, 266 (1983).
110. IN ALL FAnuinss, supra note 4, at 3.
111. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 414.
112. Id.
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The main provision of the written versions was the Indians' sur-
render of land and the government's promises of reserves, annui-
ties, education, agricultural assistance, and hunting and fishing
rights.1I 3 When the last treaty was signed in 1921, only about one-
half of Canada had been bargained for. 1 4
Pursuant to the Indian Act, which was first consolidated in
1874, all of Canada's "status Indians""' were given special treat-
ment." '6 At the time reserves were established and treaties
negotiated, Canada's Indians were classified as "status" and
"nonstatus" Indians for the purpose of determining their eligibility
for Indian Act provisions. The special treatment granted them
included:
(1) the right of a status Indian to reside on the reserve that is
assigned to his/her band, (2) freedom from estate taxes on reserve
113. Id.
114. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 288.
115. See Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 418-22. The original deter-
mination of status occurred when the government compiled membership lists of tribes
as of the time of the establishment of reserves or of treaty negotiations. The determina-
tion of whether an Indian is a status or nonstatus Indian now depends solely upon the
status of his or her father or her husband. Thus both men and women are status Indians
only if their fathers were status Indians. In addition, a woman without status could gain
it by marrying a status Indian. Conversely, an Indian woman who had status could lose
it if she married a nonstatus Indian. In sum, classification as a status Indian is not related
to racial purity. Id. at 419.
In addition to nonstatus Indians, other Canadian natives are also disallowed from qual-
ifying for Indian Act benefits. They include the M~tis and Inuit people. The Mdtis are
descendants of a half-blood population that developed in the prairie provinces between
1670 and 1870. They had a distinct identity. The Manitoba Act of 1870 provided 1.4
million acres of land for distribution "to the descendants of Half-Breed heads of families."
Later, the Dominion Lands Act extended the provision for half-blood grants to the other
prairie provinces and the Northwest Territories. Today, the best legal definition of the
M~tis is the "people who took Half-Breed grants under the Manitoba Act or the Domi-
nion Lands Act and their descendants." Id. at 419-20. Section 12(l)(a)(i) of the Indian
Act excludes M~tis from registration as Indians.
In 1939 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Inuit should be considered a tribe
of Indians. Subsequently, they were held to be within federal legislative jurisdiction over
Indians. Section 4 of the Indian Act, however, specifically excludes the Inuit. The result
has been an almost completely undefined aboriginal policy for the Inuit people of Labrador
and the Northwest Territories.
In conclusion, the Indian Act's special treatment was available to only a fraction of
the aboriginal population of Canada. While status Indians qualified for special treatment,
nonstatus Indians and M&is were definitely excluded. The standing of the Inuit was
uncertain.
116. See S. WHAVER, supra note 48, at 18-19.
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lands, (3) freedom from land taxes on reserve lands, (4) freedom
from income taxes on income earned on a reserve, (5) and the
right to vote in Band Council elections. " 7
The special treatment given Canadian Indians in the past has not
always been beneficial. "Indians were not even considered proper
citizens until 1957. They were not given the vote until 1960. '" 18
In the seventeen years since the issuance of the ill-fated White
Paper in 1969, the special treatment of natives in Canada has
changed considerably. Before 1973 the government had a long-
standing policy against recognizing claims based on aboriginal
title." 9 In 1973, however, six of the seven members of the Supreme
Court of Canada acknowledged the existence of aboriginal title
in Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia.2 Simultane-
ously, the Cree of James Bay and the Inuit of Northern Quebec
were trying to protect their homelands from the threat posed by
the James Bay Hydro Electric Project.2 ' In response to these
events, the government issued a policy statement in 1973. It ad-
dressed both the government's obligations to fulfill existing treaties
and comply with existing statutory requirements and the govern-
ment's commitment to negotiate settlements of natives' unextin-
guished aboriginal title claims.2 2 In the process of settling these
claims, called "comprehensive claims," the government recognized
that the settlements "could include the following elements:
categories of land, hunting, trapping and fishing, resource manage-
ment, cultural identity, and native involvement in governmental
evolution."' 23
The natives have sought to use the negotiation process to
reconstrue their relationship with the Canadian government. They
want to move beyond simply receiving special treatment to being
recognized as having a special relationship with the rest of Canada.
"Their claims must be seen as the means to the establishment
of a social contract based on a clear understanding that they are
a distinct people in history. They insist upon the right to deter-
117. Id.
118. Many Fingers, supra note 61, at 429.
119. IN ALL FAnxmss, supra note 4, at 11.
120. [1973] S.C.R. 313.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Hon. Judd Buchanan, remarks quoted in Many Fingers, supra note 61, at 4.
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mine their own future, to ensure their place, but not assimilation,
in 'Canadian life.' 124
Finally, Canada has given its natives special treatment in its
new constitution. Chief among the provisions applicable to
Canada's native people is section 35, which states that "the exist-
ing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed.' 1 25 Section 35 also defines
"aboriginal peoples" to include the Indian, Inuit, and Mtis people
of Canada and provides that aboriginal and treaty rights are
guaranteed equally to males and females.' 26
Section 35 does not restore to aboriginal groups the autonomy
they enjoyed 300 years ago nor revive land rights that have been
extinguished lawfully in the past. It does, however, recognize that
some of the rights originally vested in natives, such as rights to
land, self-government, customary law, cultural rights, and religious
freedom, have survived the process whereby the Crown gained
sovereignty over Canadian territories. Under the new constitution,
those rights not terminated prior to April 1982 are now protected
by section 35.127
While Canadian natives historically have received special treat-
ment, their relationship with the Canadian government has been
in no way akin to the special trust relationship that existed be-
tween natives in the United States and the United States govern-
ment. Canada's current recognition of natives' aboriginal rights,
which has included negotiating aboriginal title claims and entrench-
124. 1 T. BERGER, NORTHERN FRONTIER, NORTHERN HOMELAND: REPORT OF THE
MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY 163 (1977).
125. 1982 CoNsT. ACT § 35.
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit, and Mdtis
peoples of Canada.
FIRST MINISRS' CONFERENCE ON ABORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS, 1983 CONSTITU-
TiONAL. ACCORD ON ABORIGINAL RIGHTS (1983). A constitutional accord on aboriginal rights
was signed by the federal government, nine provincial governments (the government of
Quebec did not sign), and representatives of six native organizations on March 16, 1983.
Pursuant to this agreement, two more subsections were to be added. They are:
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now
exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights
referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
126. 1982 CONST. ACT § 35.
127. Slattery, supra note 109, at 243.
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ing aboriginal rights in the Canadian constitution, appears to auger
a new era in the relationship between Canada's aboriginal people
and the Canadian government. Although Canada's present native
policy does not appear to be as protective of native concerns as
the United States' policy, it does offer natives an opportunity to
increase their land holdings and expand their authority and abil-
ity to govern themselves. At the same time, it secures for them
greater assurance that such rights as they still retain are less
vulnerable to future erosion.
III. Property Interests
In dealing with native property interests, both the United States
and Canada have followed consistent policies of continuously ap-
propriating natives' original holdings. This practice has abated
somewhat in the last fifty years. The countries have otherwise dealt
with natives' property interests very differently. This will be illus-
trated by reviewing the two nations' positions on aboriginal title.
Also considered in this section will be the extent of property native
people currently own and the protections and limitations that have
been placed on those property interests.
United States
Johnson v. M'Intosh, decided in 1823, was the first case in
which the United States Supreme Court addressed the nature of
Indian title. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, reviewed
the history of Indian law and concluded that although Indians
were allowed to retain possession of land, the nation that
"discovered" the land "asserted the ultimate dominion to be in
themselves."' 28 This "ultimate dominion" meant that the
"discovering" nation held the "exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or by conquest." 29
The noted authority on American Indians, John Collier, observed
that "[a]t the time of white arrival there was no square mile unoc-
cupied or unused."' 130 Consequently, using Marshall's analysis,
Indians started with "title" to the entire country.
Thus the Court acknowledged that Indians had some kind of
claim to the land they occupied, but held that the United States
128. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
129. Id.
130. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 41.
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had the dominant title. As a result, Indians could transfer their
title only to the federal government. Although this limited tribal
sovereignty, it also protected the tribes against unscrupulous private
land buyers.
As the white tide of trappers, miners, and settlers flowed west,
however, tribes gave up most of their lands. In exchange for their
land claims, the United States promised to protect their sovereignty
over lands the tribes retained and promised to provide them with
various benefits such as education and health services. Because
the remaining tribal lands were often insufficient to support the
tribes, federal food distributions and rights to off-reservation hunt-
ing and fishing also were promised in the treaties.' 3 '
Treaty-making ended in 1871. Agreements between the govern-
merit and Indian tribes continued to be made, though, for a number
of years thereafter. Eventually, the entire system was abandoned.'32
although the United States treatied with tribes for the major-
ity of the tribes' land claims, such negotiations did not always
take place. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Indian tribes frequently sued the federal government, seeking to
recover lands to which they laid claim under aboriginal title.'33
In 1946, Congress decided to try to settle these claims by
establishing a special court for Indian land claims: the Indian
Claims Commission. Six hundred and seventeen claims were filed
under the Act. The Commission's judgments recognized tribes'
aboriginal title to most of the United States.'
Today, Indians in the contiguous forty-eight states control land
holdings slightly larger than an area the size of the state of
Washington. This land is spread throughout the country on reser-
vations that range in size from the Navajo Reservation in Arizona,
which is almost as large as West Virginia,' to reservations in
California and Nevada that have fewer than ten acres. 3 Virtually
all 'Indian-owned land has federal trust status. This trust status
has been created in five different ways' 37 : by treaty'38 or
131. G. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 5.
132. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 51.
133. Johnson, supra note 5, at 109.
134. Id. at 110.
135. WM. LEAST HEAT MOON, BLUE HIGHWAYS 179 (1982).
136. See generally G. HAa, supra note 69, at 94, 96, 98, 109.
137. Id. at 13.
138. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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agreement'39 between the United States and a tribe; by statute when
Congress specifically designated land as a reservation;"10 by exec-
utive order when the President designated an Indian reservation;' 1
or by "withdrawals" when the Secretary of the Interior set aside
certain "public lands" as an Indian reservation.14 2
The federal trust also applies to Indian property other than land.
First, mineral deposits located under reservations or individual
allotments are held in trust. 43 Second, the federal-trust doctrine
protects tribes' rights to the amount of water they need in order
to live on their reservations, even if the water comes from
somewhere off the reservation.14 4 Third, the federal government
is responsible for the management of tribal timber resources. 45
Fourth, tribes have approximately $440 million in trust funds for
which the federal government has a responsibility to manage. 146
Finally, hunting and fishing rights, whether reserved implicitly or
explicitly by the treaty makers,'14 are also part of the United States'
trust responsibility. The federal trust protects hunting and fishing
rights whether exercised on or off a reservation. The only time
state regulations can limit Indian hunting and fishing is when the
regulations are "indispensable to the effectiveness of a state con-
servation program."'' 48
Finally, Indian treaty rights cannot easily be abrogated. The
courts must find that Congress exhibited a clear intent to abrogate
a treaty before an Indian's property interest will be limited or
extinguished. 149 Thus the protection of Indian property interests
afforded by the federal trust responsibility has two parts. First,
the federal government must protect Indian resources against states
and private parties. Second, by requiring a showing of clear con-
gressional intent for effective abrogation of treaties, the courts
provide limited protection against congressional action as well.
139. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908).
140. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
141. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
142. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
143. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
144. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908).
145. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
146. G. HALL, supra note 69, at 15.
147. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
148. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942).
149. P. FEZER, supra note 73, at 69.
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Alaska
"Alaska was a populated country thousands of years before
Russians were to claim it .... The Native inhabitants extensively
used and occupied the land."' 50 Native claims to present-day Alaska
were first mentioned in the 1867 Treaty of Cession from Russia
and have been remarked repeatedly in federal legislation since then.
The significance and extent of native land entitlement, however,
was not defined fully until ANCSA was passed in 1971.1'1
Pressure from the state and from oil companies wanting to
develop Alaska's oil resources expedited the resolution of native
claims. The oil companies could not begin their development un-
til the state could lease them land and transfer to them rights
unclouded by native claims. The passage of ANCSA cleared these
obstacles. It also implicitly recognized the validity of the natives'
aboriginal title by carefully extinguishing their rights and claims
based upon it. 5 2
One of the rights extinguished by ANCSA was "any aboriginal
hunting of fishing rights that may exist."'5 3 This threatened
Alaskan natives' ability to continue traditional patterns of sub-
sistence hunting and fishing. The land settlement that natives re-
ceived under ANCSA was in part intended to protect subsistence
use. It is unclear, however, what regulatory authority the natives
have over their lands. 54 Fortunately for them, the state (which
has management authority over all public lands in the state) has
a history of making the subsistence use of hunting and fishing
resources its top management priority. The continuation of this
tradition is encouraged by the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA).'5 Under ANILCA, if the state fails
to enact laws that favor subsistence use of hunting and fishing
resources, the federal government will reclaim its managerial
authority to federal lands. 56 Native subsistence rights thus are
safeguarded, though not guaranteed, by state policy and federal
law.
The Alaska natives' aboriginal title was quieted by ANCSA.
They still have considerable land holdings, however. Their legal
150. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 17.
151. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 740.
152. Id. at 742.
15:3. ANCSA, supra note 97, § 1603(b).
154. See F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 759.
155. 16 U.S.C. § 3142 (1982) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 3142 (1980)).
156. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 761.
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title in their post-ANCSA land holdings has several sources. The
federal government has given specific lands to them by the crea-
tion of reservations, by the Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906,
by the 1926 Native Townsite Act, and, most recently, by ANCSA.
Between 1891 and 1933, approximately 150 reserves were created
in Alaska. They were created for economic purposes (such as the
reserves for natives' reindeer herds), educational purposes (about
eighty were formed for this reason), community development pur-
poses, and for native health purposes.' 57 The only reserve not
revoked by ANCSA is the Annette Island Reserve."5 8 Created in
1891, it was the first Alaska reserve and was one of only two
statutorily created reserves in the territory.1
59
The provisions of the Alaska Native Allotment Act were similar
to those of the General Allotment Act of 1887. It had the same
purpose of giving natives a chance to own individual plots of
land. 60 Authority to patent land to individual natives under the
Act was terminated by ANCSA. An exception was made for allot-
ment applications already pending at the time of ANCSA's
passage.' 6' "If all allotment applications are approved, more than
one million acres will be transferred to individuals as allotments.' ' 62
Allotment lands are held in trust status, which limits their alienabil-
ity and protects them against taxation. 63
The Native Townsite Act provided for the conveyance of land
to individuals in areas designated as townsites. Both natives and
nonnatives are eligible under the Act. 6 Although repealed in 1976,
the Act remains in effect where land has been "segregated" for
townsite purposes but has not yet been completely distributed.
These lands are to be deeded to the municipal government with
jurisdiction over the townsite. If no municipal government exists,
townsite trustees will hold the land in trust until a municipal govern-
ment is incorporated. 65
Most of the property interests held by Alaska natives flow from
ANCSA. It created a "complex mechanism for Native selection,
157. D. CAsE, supra note 92, at 67.
158. Id. at 43.
159. Id. at 32.
160. Id. at 49.
161. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 745.
162. R. ARNOLD, supra note 7, at 253.
163. Id.
164. Alaska Native Townsite Act of May 25, 1926, 44 Stat. 629 (repealed in 1976).
165. Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Alaska 1985),
aff'd 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986).
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administration, development and alienation of over forty million
acres of land, and expenditure, investment, and distribution of
an Alaska Native Fund of $462.5 million in congressional appro-
priations and $500 million of oil royalties.""' Through ANCSA,
Alaska natives gained fee simple title to roughly the same amount
of land as is held in trust for all other American Indians, and
they gained monetary compensation nearly four times the amount
awarded by the Indian Claims Commission during its entire 25-year
existence.' 67
Natives own an interest in the land and money by being
stockholders in one of more than two hundred village corpora-
tions and in one of thirteen regional corporations. Village cor-
porations own only the surface estate of the 22 million acres al-
lotted to them. The subsurface estate in the land selected by the
village corporations and the surface and subsurface estate in
another 16 million acres is owned by the regional corporations. 68
Two million acres are reserved for native groups and individual
natives. 69
Under the original Act, native stockholders cannot sell their
stock for twenty years, or until December 18, 1991.170 At that
time all stock will be canceled and new shares issued. The new
stock will be without the current restraints on alienation unless
the corporations amend their articles before 1991.1 71
Alaska natives have enjoyed a unique opportunity in the past
dozen years to manage their resources free from the interference
of a distant paternalistic bureaucracy. With that opportunity have
come increased responsibility and new challenges. Alaska natives'
greatest current challenges are, first, to find some way to prevent
native stock from becoming alienable in 1991, and, second, to
help their people develop the skills necessary to protect and use
the resources they possess.
166. ANCSA, supra note 97, § 1616(d)(2).
167. R. ARNoLD, supra note 7, at 147-48.
168. Id. at 149-50.
169. Id. at 151.
170. ANCSA, supra note 97, at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h).
171. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat.
2371 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 1606 (1980)). On December 2, 1980, Congress authorized
native corporations to restrict voting rights to natives and their descendants and to grant
the corporation or the corporation and the shareholders' families a first right to purchase
stock.
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Canada
Because treaties were made with Canadian natives for only half
of the land area of Canada, the extent of aboriginal title in Canada
and the criteria necessary to establish such title are of great im-
portance in assessing Canadian natives' property rights. The doc-
trine of aboriginal title stems from the fact that Native Americans
depended upon their lands for subsistence and prosperity.' 72 In
the 1885 case of St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The
Queen, 73 the Ontario High Court held that aboriginal title rights
included a right of occupancy. When the same case appeared before
the Supreme Court of Canada, Judge Strong spoke of "the recogni-
tion by the Crown of a usufructuary title in the Indians to all
unsurrendered lands."' 74 Judge Strong stated further: "This title,
though perhaps not susceptible to any accurate legal definition
in exact legal terms, was one which nevertheless sufficed to pro-
tect the Indians in the absolute use and enjoyment of their
lands."' 75 Both the right to occupancy and usufructuary title vest
in the group as a whole, rather than in individual tribal members. 76
In its new constitution, Canada has upgraded the status of
aboriginal rights. In light of section 35, questions regarding the
soundness of the doctrine of aboriginal title in Canadian law have
dissipated. Although aboriginal rights may have been precarious
in the past, they are now indefeasible. Section 35 has elevated
aboriginal title from a theoretical right to one that is fully capable
of assertion and enforcement in the courts. 177
The case law indicates that three factors are critical in deter-
mining whether a particular band or tribe will be recognized as
having aboriginal title to an area: (1) they must show exclusive
occupation for a long time; (2) the group must have an organized
society; and (3) the group must have concepts of property suffi-
ciently precise so that they may be recognized.' 78
172. Slattery, supra note 109, at 265.
173. (1885) 10 O.R. 196, 209 (Ont. C.A.).
174. St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, (1887) 13 S.C.R. 557, 608;
BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 1712 (11th ed. 1951). A "usufructuary right" is defined as
"[t]he right of enjoying a thing the property of which is vested in another and to draw
from the same all profit, utility and advantage which it may produce provided it be without
altering the substance of the thing."
175. St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, (1887) 13 S.C.R. 577, 608.
176. Gagne, The Content of Aboriginal Title at Common Law: A Look at the Nishga
Claim, 47 SASK. L. REv. 309, 329 (1983).
177. Slattery, supra note 109, at 254.
178. Gagne, supra note 176, at 318.
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As noted earlier, since 1973 the Canadian government has had
a policy of attempting to negotiate settlements to claims of
aboriginal title. While natives see the negotiation process as an
opportunity to redefine their relationship with the rest of Canada,
the government's purpose in negotiating is more modest. In the
government's view:
The negotiations are designed to deal with the non-political
matters arising from the notion of aboriginal land rights such
as lands, cash compensation, wildlife rights, and may include
self-government on a local basis.
The thrust of this policy is to exchange undefined aboriginal
land rights for concrete rights and benefits. The settlement legisla-
tion will guarantee these rights and benefits.179
Significantly, the common law provides that the rights to various
resources go with the land. Thus the right to fishery resources
accompanies ownership of the river or stream; the right to forest
resources accompanies ownership of the soil. 180
Canada's new constitution not only validates aboriginal title,
it also states that treaty rights will be "recognized and affirmed.' ' 181
Thus the natives' property interests now have constitutional pro-
tection. This is important even though only half of Canada's status
Indians had treaties with the Crown. 112 Features common to many
of the western treaties include establishment of reserves, gratuities,
annuities, medals and flags, clothes for "headmen," ammunition,
twine, and schooling where requested. Treaty No. 6, covering cen-
tral Saskatchewan and Alberta, also provided for a medicine chest
and for assistance during times of pestilence and famine.183
Today, the 561 bands of status Indians in Canada have rights
to 2,300 reserves. I" The total area of the reserves is about as large
as Nova Scotia or, by way of comparison, as large as the Navajo
Reservation in Arizona. 185
In addition to land holdings, Canadian natives may have special
hunting and fishing rights. In the past, however, these rights could
179. IN ALL FAtRNESS, supra note 4, at 19.
180. Sanders, Statement of Evidence, supra note 57, at 26.
181. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 418.
182. S. WEAVER, supra note 48, at 19.
183. MtNtsE-R oF INDIAN AFFAwS AND NORTHRN DEvELOPmENT, OtrSTANDINO Busuqss
9 (1982).
184. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 418.
185. Many Fingers, supra note 61, at 430.
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be severely limited. Under section 88 of the Indian Act, Indians
are subject to provincial laws of general application. 186 Accord-
ingly, Indians on reserves are subject to the same hunting laws
as are Indians and non-Indians off reserves. Section 88 does pro-
tect hunting rights specifically granted by treaties.' 1 7 However,
this protection was only effective against contrary provincial laws.
Before their recent constitutional recognition, treaty-protected hunt-
ing rights uniformly were held to be subject to federal legislation.
The same applies to native fishing rights. Because most of
Canada's fisheries are federally regulated, natives' special fishing
rights have been virtually meaningless. As Justice Dickson, speaking
for the Supreme Court of Canada, stated in Kruger & Manuel
v. The Queen: "However abundant the right of Indians to hunt
and fish, there can be no doubt that such right is subject to regula-
tions and curtailment by the appropriate legislative authority." 8
Finally, in addition to their reserves and hunting and fishing
rights, Canadian natives also benefit from special federal programs.
Among the special services available are medical care, housing,
welfare, and economic development.1 89 Natives' rights to these
programs are often tenuous. Not all treaties have special provi-
sions promising such services. Moreover, many of the native reci-
pients do not even have treaties.' 9
In the past, native property interests have been protected by
two doctrines. First, a series of cases holds that treaties are to
be construed liberally in favor of the natives.' 9' Second, the
Supreme Court of Canada, with Justice Ritchie speaking for the
court in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, stated that "[t]he
recognized rule for the construction of statutes is that, unless the
words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be con-
strued so as to take away the property of a subject without com-
pensation." 92
Canadian natives' property holdings probably will be increased
and further protected by the recognition given to aboriginal and
186. Kruger & Manuel v. The Queen, (1975) 1 S.C.R. 104, 111-12.
187. Brown, Indian Hunting Rights and Provincial Law: Some Recent Developments,
39 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 121, 124 (1981).
188. Pibus, The Fisheries Act and Native Fishing Rights in Canada: 1970-1980, 39
U. ToRoNTzo FAc. L. REv. 43, 50 (1981).
189. S. VEAvR, supra note 48, at 19.
190. Id.
191. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 417.
192. (1978) 6 W.W.R. 496, 503.
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treaty rights in Canada's new constitution. Section 52 of the con-
stitution asserts: "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law
of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provision
of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no
force or effect."' 93 Douglas Sanders, a noted Canadian Indian
law expert, contends that in light of the new constitution, "[t]he
major decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada which held that
treaty rights could be overridden by federal legislation would surely
now be reversed."1' 94 Sanders also suggests that in areas where
aboriginal rights are held to exist, the hunting and fishing rights
cases holding that aboriginal rights are subject to federal legisla-
tion are equally vulnerable.' 95
To summarize, Canadian natives in the past lagged behind the
aboriginal peoples of the United States in terms of the amount
of property they possessed and the degree of control they exer-
cised over it. With the entrenchment of their treaty and aboriginal
rights in the Canadian constitution, however, their position is
greatly improved. The property interests they currently control
are now better protected. Of potentially greater import, however,
their claims to vast areas of Canada, though still inchoate, have
been constitutionally recognized.
IV. Jurisdiction
As one writer observed, "The problem of jurisdiction-the flow
of power over Indian affairs from government to government-
presents an unusually rich field for testing where and when it has
been deemed critical for the dominant society to assert its laws
and impose its judicial system over a fragmented society."' 96
Generally, in both the United States and Canada there are three
significant jurisdictional frontiers. First, native jurisdiction has
always been very territorially limited-natives could only have
jurisdiction over their lands. Second, their jurisdiction has become
increasingly limited to only natives. Finally, the dominant cultures
historically have been much more insistent on exercising author-
ity over criminal matters than over civil matters.
193. Quoted in Slattery, supra note 109, at 255.
194. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 418.
195. Id.
196. M. PRIcE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN vii (1973).
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United States
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court in
Worcester v. Georgia, described Indians as having "distinct political
communities, with territorial boundaries within which their author-
ity is exclusive."'197 The Worcester Court held that the state of
Georgia had no power within the Cherokee Nation. The only
restrictions on the tribe's sovereignty, according to the Court, were
that Indian tribes could not make treaties with foreign govern-
ments and that Congress held power to place restrictions on In-
dian sovereignty.'98 Until altered by treaty or congressional legisla-
tion, however,
Indian self-government... includes the power of an Indian tribe
to adopt and operate under a form of government of the In-
dians' choosing, to define conditions of tribal membership, to
regulate domestic relations of members, to prescribe rules of in-
heritance, to levy taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdic-
tion of the tribe, to control the conduct of members by municipal
legislations, and to administer justice.' 99
The Indians' expansive right of self-government was limited by
overt congressional intrusion into their sovereignty for the first
time when Congress passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885, which
gave federal courts jurisdiction over seven categories of crimes
committed on reservations. 200 Even though tribes retain concur-
rent jurisdiction over these "major crimes," they rarely exercise
it because of their limited penal power. 0 1
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).
In response to the deterioration of tribal governments during the
Allotment Era, the IRA proposed a form of tribal government
intended to revitalize the tribes. One hundred and ninety-one tribes
voted to accept the new form of tribal government; seventy-one
voted to reject it.20 2 The IRA form of government, which is similar
to a municipal government, is based on a standardized constitu-
tion. It provides for tribal councils, tribal courts, and mandates
197. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
198. Id.
199. F. COHEN, FEDERAL IN-uni LAw 122 (1942), quoted in Keon-Cohen, supra note
17, at 287-88.
200. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 312.
201. Id.
202. G. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 11.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1988
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
open elections. Although the IRA did restore self-governing ability
to many tribes, it was criticized for imposing western ideas of
government upon Indians."' Moreover, since the IRA governments
were the conduit of federal programs to the tribes, many IRA
leaders formed power structures that challenged traditional
hereditary and religious leadership.2"" Thus, although the IRA was
a valuable aid in helping Indians maintain their sovereignty, it
was, in some cases, a simultaneous infringement upon their tradi-
tional modes of self-rule.
The United States House of Representatives Concurrent Resolu-
tion 108 of 1953 and Public Law 280, also passed in 1953, were
the most frontal assaults Congress ever made on tribal sovereignty.
Concurrent Resolution 108 requested the BIA to draw up lists
of tribes that, because of their economic self-sufficiency, could
be "terminated." This termination meant the cessation of federal
services, federal recognition of tribal governments, and tribal im-
munity from state taxation.2"5 Before 1968, when Congress for-
mally repudiated the termination policy, it had resulted for some
tribes in "almost economic and social disaster.12 6
The implications of Public Law 280, while not as catastrophic
for specific tribes as was Concurrent Resolution 108, potentially
affected all Indians in the United States. Public Law 280's pur-
pose was to remove much of the protective buffer of federaljurisdiction between tribal and state governments. Accordingly,
it provided that the federal government (1) confer upon Califor-
nia, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin criminal and
civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations and lands; (2) allow states
with constitutional prohibitions against exercising jurisdiction over
Indians to repeal them and assume jurisdiction over Indian lands;
and (3) allow all other states to legislatively assume jurisdiction
over criminal or civil matters or both. 20 7
Public Law 280 greatly reduced Indian sovereignty. Subsequent
case law and more recent legislation have limited the extent of
its constriction of tribal authority. For example, in the five states
in which both criminal and civil jurisdiction were conferred upon
the states, court decisions in the 1970s have limited application
203 Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 13.
20,5. G. HALL, supra note 69, at 24.
207. R. RENEm, PuBLic LAw 280 PROBLEMS AND PROGNOSIS 3 (1975).
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of state jurisdiction to only criminal cases. 208 In addition, the In-
dian Civil Rights Act of 1968 repealed the section of Public Law
280 that allowed a state arbitrarily to assert jurisdiction over reser-
vations.2"9 It mandated instead that a state could assume jurisdic-
tion only after the tribe had voted its consent at a special election.2 1 0
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 not only restricted the power
granted to states by Public Law 280 but also restricted Indian
self-governing authority by requiring tribal governments to pro-
vide individuals with most of the same protections ensured by the
United States Bill of Rights. 211 Additionally, it limited tribal courts
to imposing penalties of not more than $500 or six months in
jail or both.212
Tribal jurisdiction was further diminished in 1978 by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe. Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion in which the
Court held that Indian tribal courts do not have "inherent jurisdic-
tion to try and punish non-Indians. ' 21 3 By so holding, the Court
stripped tribes of authority to enforce their criminal codes against
non-Indians unless they had explicit treaty or statutory language
giving them such jurisdiction.
Today, internal affairs still considered to be within the scope
of tribal self-government usually include the power to form and
operate a system of government chosen by the tribe,21 4 the exer-
cise of civil jurisdiction "necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations, ' 215 the exercise of civil jurisdic-
tion conferred to the tribe by "express congressional delegation, '216
jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians,21 7 the power to
determine conditions of tribal membership,21 8 the levying of taxes
on tribal members, 21 9 and the regulation of tribal members' prop-
208. See G. GxossmAN, supra note 13, at 14.
209. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403b, 82 Stat. 73 (25
U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982)).
210. Id. § 406.
211. See G. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 15.
212. Indian Civil Rights Act, supra note 209, § 1302(7).
213. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
214. INDIAN JURISDICTION, supra note 18, at 6.
215. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, (1981).
216. Id. at 564.
217. E.g., P. FEMR, supra note 73, at 6.
218. INDA N JURISDICTION, supra note 18, at 6.
219. Id.
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erty, including inheritance rights °.22 This authority, of course, is
subject to congressional alteration or extinguishment. It can also
be shifted to the states, as was demonstrated by Public Law 280.
It is noteworthy that even in those spheres where Indians do
retain authority, their laws differ little from Anglo-American laws.
Tribal governments and the various Indian courts, alone with tribal
codes they administer, are almost completely based upon
documents drafted by the federal government.22' Accordingly, tribal
courts differ little from equivalent state courts of summary jurisdic-
tion, except for the aforementioned jurisdictional and punitive
limits and the fact that they are administered, in the main, by
indigenous people. The involvement of indigenous people can result
in more informed and flexible justice. It can also result in more
corrupt or incompetent justice.222
The complete tribal sovereignty over internal affairs that the
Supreme Court recognized in Worcester has been incrementally
eroded in the past 150 years. Today, tribal sovereignty, although
still considerable, is much diminished. This diminution of
sovereignty has been most extensive in situations in which one
of the parties is a non-Indian and the issue is a criminal rather
than a civil matter.
Alaska
Most Alaska natives never had the federally recognized self-
governing power held by Indians in the contiguous forty-eight
states. Instead, because of the near-total absence of reservations
in Alaska, natives were subject first to territorial law and later
to state law.223 Even so, many native villages continued to inter-
nally handle infractions of customary behaviorial norms. 4 To-
day, Alaska natives' self-governing authority is delineated by the
same federal legislation that applies to the self-governing author-
ity of Indians elsewhere in the United States.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was amended in 1936
to make it fully applicable to Alaska natives. The 1934 Act per-
mitted natives classified as "tribes," "bands," or "reservations"
to organize under federal constitutions and business charters. The
220. Id.
221. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 286.
222. Id. at 296.
223. F. CooN, supra note 46, at 763-74.
224. Id.
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1936 amendment authorized natives that had "a common bond
of occupation, or association, or residence within a well-defined
neighborhood, community or rural district" to organize pursuant
to the IRA. 225
In 1958, Public Law 280 was extended to Alaska.226 It con-
ferred upon Alaska state authorities both criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion over Indian country. As in other parts of the United States,
however, courts have narrowly interpreted the state's authority
over civil causes of action. 27 Furthermore, the initial federal grant
of jurisdiction was amended in 1970, restoring concurrent criminal
jurisdiction to Alaska's sole reservation at Metlakatla. 8
The common law doctrines that guide determinations of when
state jurisdiction may be properly applied in native communities
are the same in Alaska as they are elsewhere. Thus tribes gen-
erally have jurisdiction over their members and territory unless
their authority has been modified by Congress. 229 This retained
jurisdiction includes the power to make legislative and judicial
"determinations related to inheritance or property in which the
tribe has an interest, to distribution of tribal assets or income,
to tribal membership, to domestic relations, and to other matters
of internal self-government. ' 230
Although the same legislation and common law apply to Alaska
natives as apply to Indians in the rest of the nation, Indian law
in Alaska is complicated by two unique factual circumstances.
First, the boundaries of Indian country are difficult to draw. Sec-
ond, the abundance of sometimes competing and frequently
overlapping native organizations obfuscates the question of what
organization has what authority.
Indian country includes Indian reservations, native allotments
outside Indian reservations, and "dependent Indian commun-
ities." 23' As noted above, the Metlakatlans occupy the only Alaska
reserve that survived ANCSA. As such, it is Indian country. The
jurisdictional consequences are the same as for any other reserva-
tion in the United States subject to Public Law 280. As long as
225. D. CASE, supra note 92, at 4.
226. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 589 (amended by Pub. L. No. 85-615) (1953)).
227. D. CAsE, supra note 92, at 12.
228. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (amended by Pub. L.
No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (1970)).
229. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 764.
230. Id.
231. PnRnE & D. CAsE, supra note 100, at 11.
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they remain in Indian title, native allotments also are considered
Indian country.232 Because it affects the most Alaskan natives,
the most critical definition of Indian country is that of "depen-
dent Indian community." The crucial issue in determining whether
Alaska native villages qualify for this classification is whether,
in the wake of ANCSA, Alaska natives can still properly be con-
sidered "dependent." ANCSA implicated only lands and native
land-related claims. It did not end natives' federal benefits or pro-
tections. All major post-ANCSA Indian legislation has specifically
incl.uded Alaska natives, or their villages or corporations, as eligible
beneficiaries. 233 Thus, as long as these "indicia of dependence ex-
ist and Native people continue to reside together in a reasonably
distinct location recognized as their residence by the federal govern-
ment, they should be considered 'dependent Indian communities'." ' z
Indian country is not limited to land owned by the tribe. It
is also defined in part by the concept of community. As a result,
native jurisdiction may extend beyond tribally owned lands. The
question is, how far? As a basis for determining the parameters
of a dependent Indian community, jurisdictional definitions used
for other purposes may be helpful. For example, "lands that are
patented to Native corporations, owned by tribal governments
located within former reservations, and located within Native
villages which are municipalities, so long as they remain part of
Native communities,' '235 are all useful formulations for describ-
ing the reach of native jurisdictional powers.
Not only are the geographical boundaries of Indian country
uncertain, discerning which "governing body" is appropriate to
exercise native jurisdiction also can be difficult. About 210 ANCSA
village corporations have been formed. 236 A majority of those
villages (120) also are organized as municipalities under state law.237
The other ninety villages have maintained a separate form of in-
ternal self-government.238 Finally, about seventy of the 120 native
villages organized as municipalities have also organized under the
IRA. 239 In sum, the different combinations of jurisdictional alloca-
212. F. COHEN, supra note 46, at 766.
233. Id. at 769.
234. Id. at 766.
235. Id. at 766, 767.
236. D. CASE, supra note 92, at 130.
237. F. CoHEN, supra note 46, at 751.
238. D. CAsE, supra note 93, at 130.
239. F. CoHEN, supra note 46, at 752.
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tion that can occur in any given village are considerable. Even
though the responsibilities of the governing structures overlap,
each structure still has a distinctive jurisdictional niche.
Village corporations have the least expansive governing power.
They were established as profit-making entities and are not villages
in the sense of governmental and cultural units. z4 Their primary
purpose is to serve as vehicles for holding the lands and administer-
ing the benefits promised by ANCSA.241 Although they are in-
cluded as tribes under some Indian legislation, they "might not
fully participate in the kinds of social welfare and education pro-
grams typically available under Indian statutes." 242 Under state
law, village corporations have only proprietary authority.
Municipalities, on the other hand, have governing authority.
From the natives' perspective, in villages with few nonnatives, a
municipal government can be an effective tool for self-government.
It would be inappropriate, however, if native control of the govern-
ment becomes diluted by the growth of a nonnative constituency.243
Furthermore, most federal programs are available only to tribes
and their members. Those programs maintained through
municipalities would be available only as long as natives retained
their control of the government.2 "
Traditional native governments lack the formal structure of
municipalities organized under state law. Nonetheless, they do have
jurisdiction over internal affairs, such as controlling membership,
sanctioning individual conduct through customary law, and
regulating uniquely tribal affairs and property.245 Also, they can
serve as organizations to administer federal programs. 2 46 Even after
ANCSA, courts have continued to uphold native organizations'
sovereign immunity from suit.2 47 In short, like the native groups
organized under the IRA, traditional native governments are
"essentially equivalent to tribal governments elsewhere in the coun-
try.',,248
IRA villages or tribes retain traditional self-governing powers
240. Id. at 753.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 754.
243. Id. at 755.
244. Id. at 754.
245. Id. at 755.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 752.
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and are eligible for benefits available under the IRA.24 9 In addi-
tion, IRA corporations often own businesses and real and per-
sonal property.250 Simply stated, IRA governments have a bigger
"bundle" of self-governing authority than do the other three modes
of native self-government. It is not yet known over which people,
what subjects, and what territory that right to self-governance can
be exercised.
To conclude, the same framework of federal legislation and
common law relating to native self-government applies in Alaska
as in the contiguous states. The scope of that self-governing
authority is uncertain among Indians in the contiguous states, but
the lack of "reservations" and "tribes" and the presence of
ANCSA makes that uncertainty even greater in Alaska. Only
through further legislative and judicial definitions of Indian country
and through future tests of native self-governing authority can
the extent of Alaska natives' continuing jurisdictional powers be
determined.
Canada
Canada's new constitution almost certainly will increase the
amount of jurisdictional authority possessed by Canada's natives.
In the past, that authority has been minimal. Natives' sovereign
rights have been recognized in Canada only to the extent that they
were promised in treaties and land settlements, entailing no more
than limited recognition of their inherent title to land. An inherent
right to self-government was not acknowledged. 21' The govern-
ment.'s position had been "that Indians gave up all rights to self-
government when they signed the treaties. '252
Because self-governing authority was not reserved for Indians
when they made treaties with the Canadian government, no
preemption of provincial authority over Indians' self-government
has occurred. The government has, however, preempted provin-
cial jurisdiction over reserves in matters concerning reserve lands
and the use of those lands.2" Federal preemption also occurs when
249. Id.
250. R. PmTLE & D. CAsE, supra note 100, at 13.
251. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 305.
252. D. Ahenekew, Remarks at the Saskatchewan All-Chiefs Conference (Apr. 1977),
reprinted in Sanders, Statement of Evidence, supra note 57, at 20.
253. See Hugh, Are Northern Lands Reserved for the Indians?, 60 CAN. B. REv. 36,
71 (1932).
[Vol. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol14/iss1/3
INDIANS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS
hunting and fishing rights promised by treaty are in question. Fin-
ally, provincial governments cannot make laws applicable only
to natives or to native reserves.2 54 Aside from these limitations,
"reserves are merely separate geographical areas, separated
land." 255 The people who live on them are subject to provincial
laws in common with all residents of the province.
Thus the constitutions and powers of tribal governments in
Canada, to the limited extent they exist, have been exercised only
pursuant to powers conferred upon them by the Indian Act or
other provincial or federal legislation. 256 As a result, native govern-
ments' powers are strictly limited; they may be best described as
limited powers of local government administration.2"7 The Indian
Act, for example, gives band councils the power to make bylaws
that are consistent with the Act and allows them to make regula-
tions for a number of specified local government purposes. 258 This
conferred authority also allows limited adjudicatory sanctions,
namely a fine of no more than $100, up to thirty days in jail,
or both. All bylaws must be approved by the federal government
prior to becoming effective.259
In the past, Canadian Indians have rarely exercised even the
limited self-governing authority they possessed. In the last twenty
years, however, some bands have assumed virtually complete self-
management of their reserve lands and full administration of many
special programs. Additionally, within the last five years bands
have experimented more with their bylaw powers. Several court
cases have arisen testing band powers. 260
The only substantial Indian involvement in native justice to date
appears to be the appointment of native justices of the peace in
the Northwest Territories. They have jurisdiction over minor of-
fenses of the Canada Criminal Code, federal statutes, and North-
west Territories ordinances.26'
The impact of the constitutional establishment of natives'
aboriginal title and treaty rights certainly will augment both the
254. Id. at 70.
255. Id., quoting Sanders, Hunting Rights-Provincial Laws-Application on Indian
Reserves, 38 SAsK. L. Rv. 234, 239 (1973-1974).
256. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 288.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 423.
261. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 289.
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amount of property they control and the proprietary authority
they can exercise over it. It also may increase the self-governing
authority they possess. This could be especially true in areas where
aboriginal title has never been quieted and where comprehensive
settlements have yet to be negotiated. In these situations, natives
have a sterling opportunity to bargain for not only property but
also a measure of self-governing authority.
Analysis
In both Canada and the United States, Indian law has been
fashioned by the interplay of two political forces. The first of
these was Anglos who wanted to acquire natives' lands and
resources. Proponents of this position usually included many who
lived near native populations.2 6 The other political force was
Anglos who focused on the native people rather than on their
resources. Proponents of this position wanted to solve the "In-
dian problem." They wanted to help natives become a prosperous,
integrated part of the dominant culture.
Superficially, these forces were at cross-purposes. The developers
wanted to take what the Indians had, while the reformers wanted
to give the Indians what white people had. Remarkably, however,
the two factions seemed more often to be cooperating than con-
flicting. The history of both countries is replete with examples
of the interplay between these two groups. The Dawes Act (Allot-
ment Act of 1887) that gave individual Indians alienable land,
was touted by reformers as a device to liberate Indians from their
poverty. Land-hungry supporters of the bill, on the other hand,
recognized it as an opportunity to seize control of previously
unavailable land. The allotment era, however, was disastrous for
Indians. It left the tribes even more impoverished and dispirited,
with only a third of the land they had controlled at its outset.
In Canada, the same coalition of seemingly antagonistic fac-
tions existed. Canada's policy of creating reserves illustrates this
ironical alliance. Reserves were seen by reformers as a place to
prepare Indians for full participation in Canadian society. For
the developers, the reserves were a convenient place to confine
Indians so that new lands could be opened to development. Once
the Indians were pacified and isolated, however, there was little
official interest in them. They were progressively marginalized.
262. E.g., P. FEa'ZR, supra note 73, at 288.
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Thus, rather than being vehicles for integration, the reserves became
structures that increased Indians' separation.263
In both Canada and the United States, the last fifteen to twenty
years has been an era of self-determination for Indians. Unlike
previous eras, the developers have not been as successful in carv-
ing away native land holdings and reformers have not been as
intrusive in native affairs. During this time, natives have made
great strides in increasing their property interests through land
claims cases in New England, fishing rights cases in the Pacific
Northwest, ANCSA in Alaska, and the settlement of specific and
comprehensive claims in Canada. They also have made some pro-
gress in improving their legal position, particularly in Canada where
treaty and aboriginal rights have been recognized and codified
in the new Canadian constitution. If the gains of this era are to
be retained and extended, however, the developers and intrusive
reformers must be held at bay. This can best be accomplished,
in both countries, by a policy that combines an informed approach
to shaping native law with a concerted effort to define and imple-
ment plans for bettering the lot of the native people.
In shaping the law to protect such interests, four principles
should be kept in mind. First, in legal actions, natives need to
be cognizant of the political factors important to the court in
deciding a particular case. Second, they need to continue to push
aggressively for the promptest possible settlement of their prop-
erty claims. Next, if their goal is to exercise indigenous sover-
eignty, they need to maintain some degree of separateness from
the dominant culture. Finally, they should continuously augment
their political clout at all levels of government.
Natives have become ever more aware of the courts' sensitivity
to external political pressures."' This is appropriate. Judicial opi-
nions reflect the fact that judges may demonstrate considerable
concern for minority rights when there is little adverse political
pressure. The same judges, however, show an apparent lack of
concern for native rights when adverse political pressure is high.265
With the judiciary so sensitive to adverse political pressures, how
can natives hope to retain their treaty and aboriginal rights?
In Canada, natives might do best if they avoid the courts. At
the present time, these people appear to believe that "the courts,
263. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 423.
264. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 306, 311.
265. P. FE=ZaR, supra note 73, at 225.
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as currently constituted and in the current climate of opinion, of-
fer little further hope. This is not, in the main, a legal assess-
ment, but a political one." '266 With the legal foundation provided
by Canada's new constitution, natives should be in a better legal
position. Whether the new constitutional protections can be trans-
lated into victories in the courts is yet untested.
In the United States, natives should consider at least three fac-
tors in preparing for a lawsuit. First, if possible, they generally
should litigate in federal rather than state courts. They should
also be realistic in assessing their chances of gaining exclusive
jurisdiction over land or resources; in some situations they may
fare better by seeking less. Finally, in the area of jurisdictional
disputes, natives should concentrate their energy on cases in which
only natives are affected.
State courts, on balance, appear to disfavor natives. State court
judges seem inclined to favor results desired by the representatives
of the dominant economic forces in their state. Federal judges
more frequently protect natives' rights.2 67 A study of thirty-five
hunting and fishing cases decided between 1953 and 1980 illustrated
this differing success rate. Of the nineteen federal cases reviewed,
Indians won fifteen, or about 79 percent. Of the sixteen state cases
examined, the tribes won only six, or 38 percent.268
Natives should be realistic in assessing their chances of gaining
exclusive jurisdiction over land or resources. In native hunting
and fishing claims cases, a party asserting a right to exclusive control
of the resource usually loses. This is true regardless of whether
the party is the state or a tribe. The exception to this postulate
transpires when the case in question has received little public at-
tention.2 69 Conversely, if no assertion of exclusive authority is
made, the court will try to formulate a resolution that appears
to balance the rights of the native and nonnative parties, 270 illus-
trating that in some situations natives may get more by asking
for less. Therefore, they should balance carefully their chances
of losing a claim of exclusive jurisdiction and simultaneously their
266. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 306.
267. P. FmEZBR, supra note 73, at 225.
261. Id. at 127.
269. Fetzer concludes that judges want to preserve an appearance of impartiality. Thus,
if there is public scrutiny of a case, judges will try very hard to "split the pie." If the
public is unaware of the case, judges are more willing to award one of the parties a more
sweeping victory. Id. at 122.
270. Id. at 123-25.
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cause of action, against what they might be able to win if they
seek only a shared interest in the resource. U.S. Deputy Solicitor
General Louis Clairborne acknowledged this:
We prevailed in the Washington Fishery Case, but not by much.
I suspect all it would have taken to lose that case was to ridicule
the 50 percent formula and insist that the tribes enjoy an unlimited
and open-ended right to catch all the fish they could net, leav-
ing only what was left to the other fishermen. 271
Finally, if natives have a jurisdictional question on which they
want a ruling, they have the best chance of gaining a favorable
outcome if they raise it under circumstances in which the affected
native population outnumbers the affected normative population.
In twelve United States Supreme Court cases addressing native
jurisdiction-the first of which was the 1959 case of Williams v.
Lee 72 and the last Montana v. United States2 "71-eleven of the
cases, or 92 percent, were decided in favor of the party that
represented the most people.2 7 The only aberration was Montana
v. United States.275 Thus, the Supreme Court apparently prefers
a result that is supportive of the numerically dominant party.27 6
The second principle natives need to be mindful of in trying to
shape the law to protect them is the importance of the promptest
possible settlement of their property claims. While the reserved-
rights doctrine in the United States protects natives' inchoate rights
to resources such as land, water, and fish, there is a "danger in
waiting too long for the settlement of Indian claims to share
resources. ' 277 Nonnatives often begin using the resources. When
natives bring their claim, therefore, nonnatives may have a con-
siderable economic investment in their use of the resource. As
a consequence, courts often limit natives' reserved rights to
minimize the adverse impact that would otherwise befall non-
natives. The reallocation process can also cause great discord be-
tween natives and nonnatives. Thus, "[i]t would seem wiser to
resolve these claims while the resources are still unused, or at least
271. Id. at 235, quoting Clairborne.
272. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
273. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
274. P. FETZER, supra note 73, at 189.
275. Id. at 161.
276. Id. at 214.
277. Johnson, supra note 5, at 118.
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only partially utilized, and when no one, or at least only a few
persons, will be hurt by a settlement. ' 2 78
In Canada, the same situation exists. The government has
recognized the validity of natives' aboriginal rights. It is prepared
to negotiate settlements of both comprehensive and specific claims.
At the same time, the government has specifically stated that the
interest of present nonnative resource users also are acknowledged
and will be protected. In its policy statement regarding the settle-
ment of specific claims, the Canadian government stated, "As
a general rule, the government will not accept any settlement which
will lead to third parties being dispossessed. ' 21' 9 The protection
of established nonnative property interests may explain why
negotiations to settle natives' aboriginal land claims have progressed
primarily in the sparsely populated northern territories of Canada,
even though natives also have extinguished claims in the more
densely populated maritime provinces and in British Columbia. 8 '
In summary, the courts and governments of Canada and the
United States will countenance no more than limited displacement
of established nonnative interests. When the Passamaquoddies'
claim to their traditional lands in Maine was pending, the Bangor
Daily News editorialized: "Unless this country is prepared to
destroy itself in the name of justice, it is madness to foresee 1,500
or so Maine citizens of any color, creed or ancestral origin, get-
ting 10 or 12 million acres of land worth billions of dollars."2 8 '
The clear lesson is that natives can best secure their property in-
terests by promptly establishing what they are and by quickly put-
ting them to use.
For natives to exact the fullest possible self-governing author-
ity, it is important that they retain jurisdictional autonomy. As
a small minority in both Canada and the United States, natives
cannot affect the dominant culture to a great degree. Indeed, from
their standpoint the danger is that they gradually will lose their
special status. In the contiguous forty-eight states, it is important
that Indians continue to maintain their land base and press to
maintain a separate government. The latter perhaps is more critical.
As tribal governments have come to realize in recent years, the
jurisdictional issue is the cutting edge of their assertion of tribal
278. Id.
279. OUTSTANDING Bushtss, supra note 183, at 31.
280. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 67, at 414.
281. P. FETZER, supra note 73, at 168.
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autonomy and sovereign powers." 2 Furthermore, the growing asser-
tion of tribal justice as an integral component of tribal govern-
ment is a positive step toward entrenching and expanding tribes'
self-governing authority.
In Canada, the present is a time of sweeping change in the way
natives relate to the federal and provincial governments. Much
of this change is being or will be achieved through the comprehen-
sive claims settlement process. Natives recognize that this process
is an opportunity for them to redefine and redetermine their place
in Canadian society.2"3 Again, autonomy is an important protec-
tion they must seek in preparing for a future that will have ongo-
ing challenges to their sovereign powers. '
Natives in Alaska are currently in the greatest danger of losing
their separateness and in the best position to protect their interests
if that should happen. They face an increased danger of losing
their separateness because most of them do not live on reserva-
tions. Instead, their lands are held by native corporations. Because
the land is not held in trust for them by the federal government,
it has not been considered Indian country. As a result, the natives
have only proprietary authority over it. In sum, the extent of their
self-governing authority is limited in comparison with other United
States natives. Additionally, when their ANCSA stock becomes
282. Keon-Cohen, supra note 17, at 311.
283. Jackson, supra note 61, at 4.
284. The situation currently confronting natives in the Northwest Territories illustrates
the fact that choosing autonomy can conflict with other priorities. As noted in Pugh,
supra note 253, at 79-80:
The real possibility of substantial federal legal regimes in the north based on race is
emerging ... at the time when the territorial assembly has come under the control
of the northern aboriginal people.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the territorial government is without
authority to tax Native reserve lands. Thus, the establishment of extensive Native reserves
would hamstring the territorial government. Clearly, it could be tempting to Natives
to forego the establishment of reserves in the interest of maintaining a more robust
territorial government for them to direct. The danger of such a course of action, however,
is that the Natives may some day lose the ability to control the territorial government.
If the chance to create reserves has passed, they then would be bereft of all governing
authority. Hence, the choice confronting Natives in the Northwest Territories is whether
to opt for the creation of reserves even though it undermines the territorial government-
or to forego reserves to save the territorial government even though doing so would
leave the Natives vulnerable to the possible loss of lands they might otherwise have
had. Unless the Natives are very confident that they can continue to control the terri-
torial government in the future, choosing reserves, whatever the consequences of such
a choice to the territorial government, would seem the more prudent alternative.
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alienable in 1991, Alaska natives may lose much of their resource
base.
Despite their vulnerability, Alaska natives are, unlike natives
elsewhere in the United States, a powerful political force in their
state. They are comparatively wealthy, comprise a relatively large
portion of the population, and have a tradition of action and prom-
inent involvement in the territorial and state government. Even
so, they are a minority and, consequently, are vulnerable to the
majority. They must determine, therefore, what kind of protec-
tion or special status they need and how they obtain that status.285
One thing appears clear: Regardless of what other arrangement
is sought to protect their resources, it would be to their advan-
tage to organize under the Indian Reorganization Act. Doing so
would put them in a stronger position to argue their right to exert
broader self-governing powers. It would also help cement their
special relationship with the federal government and ensure their
eligibility for federal programs targeted exclusively at "tribal
members. 2816 While IRA organization would be only a small step
toward establishing natives' separateness, it would be a critical
beginning. 87
Finally, natives should continue to augment their political clout
at all levels of government. As discussed above, not only are
legislatures responsive to political pressure, the judicial decision-
making process is also susceptible to political pressure.2 8 As a
sometimes infinitesimal minority, natives cannot hope to control
the political system. They can, however, mobilize public opinion
on their behalf. In so doing, they can at least decrease the damage
that. might otherwise be done to their interests.
The four principles enumerated above-approaching litigation
in a savvy way, promptly settling outstanding claims, establishing
native resources and rights as separate from those of the domi-
nant culture, and augmenting native political clout-will help
285. R. Pmmn & D. CAsE, supra note 100, at 4-6, 25.
286. D. CAsE, supra note 92, at 131.
287. Village scraps City Council in favor of tribal government, Anchorage Daily News,
Nov. 12, 1983, p. B5. The village of Akiachok voted to disband its City Council, which
was a municipal government organized under state law, in favor of a tribal government
under exclusive tribal control. The action was taken because of the "constant confusion
over whether [the City Council] or the tribal council had the authority in village affairs."
The action is also significant in that it more firmly establishes the separateness of natives'
governing structure and power.
288. P. FETZER, supra note 73, at 122.
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natives keep their property interests. For them to retain the fullest
possible degree of internal autonomy, however, their living con-
ditions need to continue to be improved. Otherwise, reformers may
decide (as they have in the past) that they need to solve the "In-
dian problem." Some of their past "solutions" include the Dawes
Act and legislation leading to the termination era. The altruistic
intrusions of the reformers can be as devastating as the self-serving
acts of the developers. It is therefore incumbent upon native leaders
to make the self-determination era not only a time of native
political achievement but also a time of social and economic
improvement.
Moreover, native leaders need to continue to stress to nonnatives
that the "Indian problem" is not one for the Anglos to solve.
Native leaders must first continue to encourage improvements in
Indians' educational achievements and standards of living. A
special challenge will be to make these changes in a way that af-
firms their cultural mores.
The other measure these leaders can take is to stress their desire
for self-determination in discussions and communications with
government officials and reformers. They should reiterate that
they want enablement, not protection. They should try to teach
the governments of both Canada and the United States that good
faith in keeping promises does not provide license for intrusions
into native affairs, regardless of how well-meaning those intru-
sions may be.
In summary, as a small minority, Indians are politically feeble.
Because of their extensive property interests and unique place in
the history of North America, they likely are destined to be an
embattled people. They may have to struggle indefinitely to re-
tain their resources and maintain their identity-a battle waged
not only in the courts and legislatures of Canada and the United
States but also in the minds and souls of the Indian people.
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